余明桂;潘红波;

• 1:武汉大学经济与管理学院

摘要(Abstract)：

本文分析政治关系是否有利于民营企业获得银行贷款。我们以我国1993～2005年在沪深交易所上市的民营企业为样本,以这些企业的董事长或总经理是否是现任或前任的政府官员、人大代表或政协委员来判断企业是否具有政治关系。研究结果发现,有政治关系的企业比无政治关系的企业获得更多的银行贷款和更长的贷款期限,而且,在金融发展越落后、法治水平越低和政府侵害产权越严重的地区,政治关系的这种贷款效应越显著。这些研究结果表明,在我国金融发展较落后、法治水平较低和产权保护不强的制度条件下,政治关系可以作为一种替代性的非正式机制,缓解落后的制度对民营企业发展的阻碍作用,帮助民营企业获得银行的信贷支持,促进企业发展。

关键词(KeyWords)： 政治关系;银行贷款;民营企业;非正式制度

Abstract:

Keywords:

基金项目(Foundation): 国家自然科学基金项目"信贷歧视、商业信用与企业融资行为研究"的资助编号:70602013)

作者(Author): 余明桂;潘红波;

Email:

DOI:

参考文献(References)：

• [1]樊纲、王小鲁:《中国市场化指数——各地区市场化相对进程报告[2000年]》,经济科学出版社,2001年。
• [2]樊纲、王小鲁:《中国市场化指数——各地区市场化相对进程报告[2001年]》,经济科学出版社,2003年。
• [3]樊纲、王小鲁、朱恒鹏:《中国市场化指数——各地区市场化相对进程2006年报告》,经济科学出版社,2007年。
• [4]胡旭阳:《民营企业家的政治身份与民营企业的融资便利——以浙江省民营百强企业为例》,《管理世界》,2006年第5期。
• [5]卢峰、姚洋:《金融压抑下的法治、金融发展和经济增长》,《中国社会科学》,2004年第1期。
• [6]世界银行:《政府治理、投资环境与和谐社会:中国120个城市竞争力的提高》,报告编号No.37759-CN.,2006年。
• [7]Agrawal,A.and C.R.Knoeber,2001,“Do Some Outside Directors Play A Political Role?”Journal of Law and Economics,Vol.44,pp.179～198.
• [8]Allen,F.,R.Chakrabarti,S.De,J.Qian,and M.J.Qian,2006,“Financing Firms in India”,World Bank Policy Research Working Paper3975.
• [9]Allen,F.,J.Qian and M.J.Qian,2005,“Law,Finance and Economic Growth in China”,Journal of Financial Economics,Vol.77,pp.57～116.
• [10]Bai,C.E,J.Lu and Z.Tao,2006,“Property Rights Protection and Access to Bank Loans:Evidence from Private En-terprises in China”,Economics of Transition,Vol.14,pp.611～628.
• [11]Bartels,L.and H.Brady,2003,“Economic Behavior in Political Context”,American Economic Review,Vol.93,pp.156～161.
• [12]Beck,T.,A.Demirgüc-Kunt and V.Maksimovic,2005,“Financial and Legal Constraints to Firm Growth:Does Size Mat-ter?”,Journal of Finance,Vol.60,pp.137～177.
• [13]Beck,T.,R.Levine and N.Loayza,2000,“Finance and Sources of Growth”,Journal of Financial Economics,Vol.58,pp.261～300.
• [14]Boyreau-Debray,G.and S.J.Wei,2005,“Pitfalls of a State Dominated Financial System:The Case of China”,NBER Working Paper,No.11214.
• [15]Brandt,L.and H.Li,2003,“Bank Discrimination in Transition Economies:Ideology,Information or Incentives?”,Journal of Comparative Economics,Vol.31,pp.387～413.
• [16]Cai,H.,H.Fang,and L.C.Xu,2005,“Eat,Drink,Firms and Government:An Investigation of Corruption from En-tertainment and Travel Costs of Chinese Firms”,NBER Working Paper,No.11592.
• [17]Charumilind,C.,R.Kali and Y.Wiwattanakantang,2006,“Connected Lending:Thailand before the Financial Cri-sis”,Journal of Business,Vol.79,pp.181～217.
• [18]Che,J.and Y.Qian,1998,“Institutional Environment,Community Government and Corporate Governance:Understand-ing China’s Township-Village Enterprises”,Journal of Law,Eco-nomics and Organization,Vol.14,pp.1～23.
• [19]Chen,C.,Z.Li and X.Su,2005,“Rent Seeking Incen-tives,Political Connections and Organizational Structure:Empir-ical Evidence from Listed Family Firms in China”,Working Pa-per,City University of Hong Kong.
• [20]Claessens,S.,E.Feijen and L.Laeven,2007,“Political Connections and Preferential Access to Finance:The Role of Campaign Contributions”,Journal of Financial Economics,forth-coming.
• [21]Claessens,S.and L.Laeven,2003,“Financial Devel-opment,Property Rights and Growth”,Journal of Finance,Vol.58,pp.2401～2436.
• [22]Clarke,D.,1996,“The Creation of a Legal Structure for Market Institutions in China”,Reforming Asian Socialism:The Growth of Market Institutions,edited by John McMillan and Bar-ry Naughton.Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press,pp.39～59.
• [23]Cull,R.and L.C.Xu,2005,“Institutions,Ownership and Finance:The Determinants of Profit Reinvestment Among Chinese Firms”,Journal of Financial Economics,Vol.77,pp.117～146.
• [24]Demirguc-Kunt,A.and V.Maksimovic,1998,“Law,Finance and Firm Growth”,Journal of Finance,Vol.53,pp.2107～2137.
• [25]Demirguc-Kunt,A.and V.Maksimovic,1999,“Institu-tions,Financial Markets and Firm Debt Maturity”,Journal of Fi-nancial Economics,Vol.54,pp.295～336.
• [26]Diamond,D.W.,1991,“Monitoring and Reputation:The Choice between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt”,Journal of Political Economy,Vol.99,pp.689～721.
• [27]Faccio,M.,2006,“Politically-Connected Firms”,American Economic Review,Vol.96,pp.369～386.
• [28]Faccio,Mara,Ronald W.Masulis and John J.Mc-Connell,2006,“Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts”,Journal of Finance,Vol.61,pp.2597～2635.
• [29]Fan,J.P.,S.Titman and G.Twite,2007,“An Interna-tional Comparison of Capital Structure and Debt Maturity Choic-es”,Journal of Finance,forthcoming.
• [30]Fan,J.P.,T.J.Wong and T.Zhang,2007,“Politically-connected CEOs,Corporate Governance and Post-IPO Perfor-mance of China's Newly Partially Privatized Firms”,Journal of Financial Economics,Vol.84,pp.330～357.
• [31]Fraser,D.,H.Zhang and C.Derashid,2006,“Capital Structure and Political Patronage:The Case of Malaysia”,Journal of Banking and Finance,Vol.30,pp.1291～1308.
• [32]Friedman,E.,S.Johnson,D.Kaufmann,and P.Zoido-Lobaton,2000,“Dodging the Grabbing Hand:the Determinants of Unofficial Activity in69Countries”,Journal of Public Eco-nomics,Vol.76,pp.459～493.
• [33]Frye,T.and A.Shleifer,1997,“The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand”,American Economic Review,Vol.87,pp.354～385.
• [34]Frye,T.and E.Zhuravskaya,2000,“Rackets,Regula-tions and the Rule of Law”,Journal of Law,Economics and Or-ganization,Vol.16,pp.478～502.
• [35]Gordon,R.and W.Li,2003,“Government as a Dis-criminating Monopolist in the Financial Market:The Case of Chi-na”,Journal of Public Economics,Vol.87,pp.283～312.
• [36]Hay,J.and A.Shleifer,1998,“Private Enforcement of Public Laws:a Theory of Legal Reform”,American Economic Review,Vol.88,pp.398～403.
• [37]Hellman,J.,G.Jones,and D.Kaufmann,2003,“Seize the State,Seize the Day:State Capture and Influence in Transi-tion Economies”,Journal of Comparative Economics,Vol.31,pp.751～773.
• [38]Johnson,S.,D.Kaufmann,J.McMillan,and C.Woodruff,2000,“Why do Firms Hide?Bribes and Unofficial Ac-tivity after Communism”,Journal of Public Economics,Vol.76,pp.495～520.
• [39]Johnson,S.,D.Kaufmann,and A.Shleifer,1997,“The Unofficial Economy in Transition”,Brookings Papers on Eco-nomic Activity,Vol.2,pp.159～239.
• [40]Johnson,S.,J.McMillan and C.Woodruff,2002,“Property Rights and Finance”,American Economic Review,Vol.92,pp.1335～1356.
• [41]Johnson,S.and T.Mitton,2003,“Cronyism and Capital Vontrols:Evidence from Malaysia”,Journal of Financial Eco-nomics,Vol.67,pp.351～382.
• [42]Khwaja,A.I.and A.Mian,2005,“Do lenders Favor Politically-connected Firms?Rent Provision in an Emerging Fi-nancial Market”,Quarterly Journal of Economics,Vol.120,pp.1371～1411.
• [43]Krugman,P.,1998,“What happened to Asia?”,Mimeo,Princeton University.
• [44]La Porta,R.,F.Lopez-de-Silanes and A.Shleifer,2002,“Government Ownership of Banks”,Journal of Finance,Vol.57,pp.265～302.
• [45]Li,H.,L.Meng,Q.Wang and L.A.Zhou,2005,“Po-litical Connections and firm Performance:Evidence from Chinese Private Firms”,Working Paper2005-E-11-CIG,The Chinese U-niversity of Hong Kong.
• [46]Li,H.,L.Meng and J.Zhang,2006,“Why Do En-trepreneurs Enter Politics?Evidence from China”,Economic In-quiry,Vol.44,pp.559～578.
• [47]McMillan,J.,1995,“China’s Nonconformist Reforms”,Economic Transition in Eastern Europe and Russia:Realities of Reform,edited by Edward P.Lazear.Stanford:Hoover Institution Press,pp.419～433.
• [48]McMillan,J.,1997,“Markets in Transition”,Advances in Economics and Econometrics,Volume II,edited by David M.Kreps and Kenneth F.Wallis,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,pp.210～239.
• [49]McMillan,J.and C.Woodruff,1999a,“Interfirm Rela-tionships and Informal Credit in Vietnam”,Quarterly Journal of Economics,Vol.114,pp.1285～1320.
• [50]McMillan,J.and C.Woodruff,1999b,“Disputes Pre-vention without Courts in Vietnam”,Journal of Law,Economics and Organization,Vol.15,pp.637～658.
• [51]McMillan,J.and C.Woodruff,2002,“The Central Role of Entrepreneurs in Transition Economies”,Journal of Economic Perspectives,Vol.16,pp.153～170.
• [52]Pearson,M.,1997,“China’s New Business Elite:The Political Consequences of Economic Reform”,Berkeley,University of California Press.
• [53]Rajan,R.,1992,“Insiders and Outsiders:The Choice between Informed and Arm's-Length Debt”,Journal of Finance,Vol.47,pp.1367～1400.
• [54]Rajan,R.and L.Zingales,1995,“What Do We Know about Capital Structure?Some Evidence from International Da-ta”,Journal of Finance,Vol.50,pp.1421～1460.
• [55]Rajan,R.and L.Zingales,1998,“Financial Depen-dence and Growth”,American Economic Review,Vol.88,pp.559～586.
• [56]Shleifer,A.,1997,“Government in Transition”,Euro-pean Economic Review,Vol.41,pp.385～410.
• [57]Shleifer,A.and R.Vishny,1998,The Grabbing Hand:Government Pathologies and Their Cures,Cambridge,MA:Har-vard University Press.
• [58]Walder,A.,1995,“China’s Transitional Economy:In-terpreting its Significance”,China Quarterly,Vol.144,pp.963～979.
• [59]White,H.,1980,“Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Co-variance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedastic-ity”,Econometrica,Vol.48,pp.817～838.